"I hope that everything that was said today would make any potential aggressor think twice, since unfriendly steps against Russia such as deploying missile defences and bringing NATO infrastructure closer to the Russian border become ineffective in military terms and entail unjustified costs, making them useless for those promoting these initiatives.
It was our duty to inform our partners of what I said here today under the international commitments Russia had subscribed to.
When the time comes, foreign and defence ministry experts will have many opportunities to discuss all these matters with them, if of course our partners so desire."
Vladimir Putin, March 01, 2018
"Today I submitted my own views, private views, to - called [Zda] weekly...- specifically devoted to the issue raised by President Joseph Biden on the 1st of August. And I said that the time has not come to tackle, to debate this issue in the present day situation.
But the present day situation is not in favor of starting such kind of talks devoted to new START treaty number 4. Military encounter in Ukraine, deployment of anti ballistic missile at operational bases in Romania...and soon will be operational in Poland, and we consider that this kind of facilities can be used for housing not only defensive or interceptor missiles, weapons, but also offensive, like land-based cruise missiles, nuclear tip, and in the future also hypersonic missile.
We ...in the Russian Federation...still living, while watching day in day out, ..the NATO airforce operation called 'Baltic air policing' in the airspace of 3 Baltic nations - Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, plus Poland ...This operation has dual capable aircraft, of all 3 nuclear western nuclear powers and we do not know what kind of air drop bomb this interceptor bombers of the United Kingdom, France and the United States...we do not know what kind of weapons they are carrying, because we can't send our inspectors because we have never conducted any negotiations whatsoever on this specific issue."
Dr. Vladimir Kozin, Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences Oct 6, 2022
"You all remember well that the Soviet Union decided to liquidate ground-based medium-range missiles. The Americans did the same with their Pershings.
However, in addition to ground-based medium-range missiles, the Americans also had similar sea-based and air-based missile systems, while the Soviet Union did not. Therefore, it was, to a certain extent, unilateral disarmament on our part.
The potential enemy kept these systems at sea and in the air, and we gained nothing at all."
Vladimir Putin 16 December 2024
"...we consider it important to point out that it is absolutely incorrect to talk about Russia’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty. We did not take any action to withdraw.
The United States unilaterally withdrew from the treaty, which led to its termination. Russia, on the contrary, remained fully committed to it throughout the entire period of validity and, until the very last minute, made consistent efforts to keep the treaty alive.
We had come up with a number of initiatives to settle the existing counterclaims.
Once implemented, they could have saved the treaty.
It should also be kept in mind that Berlin insisted on us showing the 9M729 missile “if Russia has nothing to hide.” Specifically, Foreign Minister Heiko Maas told Sergey Lavrov this. However, when we organised a demonstration of the 9M729 missile, which went far beyond our obligations under the INF Treaty, German officials suddenly lost interest and never showed up. We believe this says a lot."
Russian Federation Information and Press Department 28 October 2020
"Equally concerning is the US activity in developing high-precision ground-based strike systems with a firing range of up to 5,500 km and preparing them for deployment in forward zones. Moreover, the transfer and deployment of these missile systems are already being prepared in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.
Let me remind you that in the past, these measures were prohibited under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which ceased to be in effect at the initiative of the United States.
We have repeatedly stated that the termination of this treaty will have negative consequences for global security as a whole, while stressing that we will not deploy intermediate-and shorter-range missiles until American weapons of this kind appear in any region of the world.
In fact, Russia has taken on these obligations unilaterally. However, as I said, if the United States begins to deploy such systems, then all our voluntary restrictions will be lifted.
"During July’s Nato summit, the United States and Germany reached an agreement for the US to start what it referred to as “episodic deployments” of missiles in 2026. This will include Tomahawk cruise missiles, SM-6 ballistic missiles and a new generation of hypersonic systems currently under development. The main condition of the agreement is that none of these missiles will be equipped with nuclear warheads."
Christoph Bluth, The Conversation, 14 August 2024
4 August 2025 19:04
Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles
Against the backdrop of deliberate steps by the United States, which resulted in the termination in 2019 of the validity and existence of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), as well as in subsequent years, the Russian Federation has been proactively making efforts to promote restraint in this area. In particular, this was reflected in the top-level statements made in 2019-2020, which provided for the voluntary adoption by our country of unilateral self-restrictions precluding the deployment of ground-launched INF-range missiles unless similar US-made missile weapons emerge in the relevant regions of the world. In parallel, Russia directly called upon NATO countries to declare a reciprocal moratorium on deploying weapon systems formerly banned under the INF Treaty, and upon the US allies in the Asia-Pacific to support our efforts in preventing a race of such armaments in the region.
However, we have to state that Russian initiatives have not been reciprocated. The United States and its allies have not only openly declared plans to deploy US ground-launched INF-range missiles in various regions, but have also made significant progress in the practical implementation of their intentions.
The increasing body of objective data reveals, in particular, the following:
- the testing of baseline versions of a wide range of the above-mentioned weapons developed by Washington has mostly completed or is at its final stages;
- serial production of some of these systems is now underway;
- the Pentagon is forming and locating specialized units and commands in respective regions to enable the forward deployment and employment of such weapons;
- the requisite infrastructure is also being prepared to suit these purposes;
- there is growing evidence that missile systems of the aforementioned range are transferred directly to areas of military exercises conducted jointly with allies outside the US national territory.
Specifically, since 2023, we have observed instances when US systems capable of launching INF-range missiles from land were transported to some European NATO countries for trial use in the course of exercises that clearly had anti-Russian focus. In particular, it includes drills in Denmark involving a mobile (portable) Mk70 launcher.
With regard to the Asia-Pacific, we note that under the pretext of training activities, a Typhon mid-range missile system was brought to the Philippines in April 2024 and is still stationed on the archipelago. A system of the same type was employed this July in Australia during live-fire exercises as part of the Talisman Sabre 2025 multilateral drills. In the course of these drills, the US military personnel also deployed a Dark Eagle hypersonic intermediate-range system, marking its first overseas appearance. It was openly declared that this deployment was undertaken "to project power", as well as underscored that such systems are rapidly redeployable.
Furthermore, during Talisman Sabre 2025, an Australian crew of the US-supplied HIMARS system launched a US-manufactured PrSM missile, which had been tested by the Pentagon back in 2021 to a range of more than 500 km and which consequently qualifies as a ground-launched INF-class missile. Prior to this, such missiles were launched by the US Army units using a future autonomous HIMARS-based platform during a live-fire event that took place last June on the territory of the Republic of Palau.
Notably, the described tests and training launches of the PrSM missile, future modifications of which are expected to be test-fired at ranges exceeding 1000 km, effectively mean that every combat unit of the M142 HIMARS and similar M270 MLRS tracked system can be regarded as a land-based launcher for INF-range missiles. And this comes while significant numbers of the US weapons of these types have already been deployed and continue to be stationed in many countries around the world, adding in multiple cases to the arsenals of US allies and partners, including Ukraine, which is employing these systems in its warfare against the Russian Federation.
Therefore, it is evident that US-made weapons falling due to their specifications into the category of ground-launched INF-range missile systems are increasingly emerging in various regions, including those of particular importance to the Russian Federation in terms of national security.
The described actions by the United States and its allies are accompanied by the official statements of the intent to ensure the “long-term” (in fact, permanent) presence of US weapons of the specified class in Europe and the Asia-Pacific.
In particular, Washington and Berlin have announced plans to begin in 2026 deployments of the aforementioned Typhon and Dark Eagle systems in the German territory, aiming at their “enduring stationing”. Moreover, a specialized “Task Force” of the US military personnel has already been permanently positioned in Germany since 2021.
A significant additional factor is the stated intention by several US allies to aquire ground-launched INF-range missiles from Washington and / or develop their own missiles with a range from 500 to 5500 km, or to expand their existing national arsenals of such weapons. Obviously, such weapon systems will supplement the inventory of means to be used while practicing and potentially conducting the so-called “integrated” operations jointly planned by US and allied militaries within relevant alliances and coalitions.
In aggregate, the above-mentioned steps of “the collective West” entail the formation and augmentation of destabilizing missile capabilities in the regions adjacent to the Russian Federation, creating a direct threat to the security of our country, which is strategic in nature.
In general, these dynamics carry a serious negative charge and are fraught with significant destructive implications for regional and global stability, including a dangerous escalation of tensions between nuclear powers.
Russia has consistently made it clear that such a scenario will demand that our country take offsetting military-technical measures in order to counter newly emerging threats and maintain strategic balance.
Since our repeated warnings in this regard have been ignored and the situation is developing along the path of the actual emplacement of the US-made ground-launched INF-range missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, the Russian Foreign Ministry has to state that the conditions for maintaining a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of similar weapons have ceased to exist.
The Ministry is authorized to declare that the Russian Federation no longer considers itself bound by the relevant previously adopted self-restrictions.
Decisions on the specific parameters of response measures will be made by the leadership of the Russian Federation based on interagency analysis with regard to the scope of the deployment of the US and other Western ground-launched INF-range missiles, as well as to the overall evolution in the area of international security and strategic stability.
"In January 2022 the leaders of 5 nuclear weapons States made a joint affirmation that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." They committed to progress nuclear disarmament, and, rather curiously, the ambiguous phrase "and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” "
"...a first strike, by the way, the tactic to be used in a first strike is to bring Ohio class submarines close to Russia's shores, fire off their Trident missiles on a flattened trajectory to avoid detection so you can strike the targets quicker - which is what Trump just actually appeared to order the US Navy to do.
So the dead hand now becomes a factor because if Trump is dumb enough to launch an attack against Russia, the dead hand, the 'perimeter system' will ensure that all of Russia's strategic nuclear forces will be fired against the United States even if Trump takes out Putin, the National Command Authority, etc.
I know this is a fact. When I was a weapons inspector in Votkinsk, there was a missile crisis in March of 1990 because the Russians were trying to get three missiles out of the factory without us turning on the cargo scan x-ray system. Why? These weren't three SS25 missiles. They don't care if we see those. These were three of what they Sirina. These were modified SS-25s [ICBM], not to carry nuclear warheads, but to carry the radio equipment that's used to broadcast the codes. They needed to get these missiles out and deployed and ready so that the perimeter system was alive and well and living. The dead hand is only defensive in nature. Trump should feel no threat from this - unless he's planning on attacking Russia."
Scott Ritter, former weapons inspector 2 August 2025
"Given the escalating geopolitical tensions, we must adopt additional measures to ensure the security of Russia and its allies. We are doing this carefully and thoughtfully, without becoming drawn into a full-scale arms race that would damage the socioeconomic development of the country.
We pay significant attention to improving the combat strength of the Armed Forces and increasing their capabilities. As part of these efforts, the Leningrad and Moscow military districts, as well as a number of new units and formations, have been created. The authorised strength of the Armed Forces has been increased to 1.5 million servicemen...this year, on average, over 1,000 men have been joining military service under contract every day...Last year, over 300,000 of our citizens, our men, came to military enlistment centres and signed contracts to serve in the Armed Forces – over 300,000.
This year, to date, the number has already exceeded 430,000, and this influx of volunteers shows no signs of stopping.
The army and navy are being re-equipped with up-to-date weapons and equipment at an accelerated pace. For example, the share of such weapons in the strategic nuclear forces has already reached 95 percent...
...The troops are receiving advanced robotic systems, including those using artificial intelligence technologies, such as reconnaissance and attack UAVs, unmanned boats and multi-purpose robotic platforms...
...strategic nuclear forces remain, without a doubt, a key tool for maintaining stability and protecting Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We will keep maintaining their potential and balanced growth, and continue working on creating new deterrent force systems and complexes.
...The most important task is to ensure the timely detection of the launch of such missiles [US/NATO short and intermediate range missiles] and to intercept them.
...it is necessary to streamline the serial production and the deployment of such domestically manufactured attack systems, including hypersonic systems.
it is necessary to more widely implement the experience gained during the special military operation into the combat training of troops, as well as into the higher military training institutions’ curricula.
Concurrently, it is necessary to improve the methods for conducting military operations, to update the fundamental statutory documents, and to raise the level of masterful use of weapons and equipment, as well as to increase the effectiveness of troop command and control, especially at the tactical and operational-tactical levels.
To reiterate, talented officers and non-commissioned officers who have proved themselves in difficult combat situations must join the core command staff of the Armed Forces and teach at military training institutions.
Fourth, the experience gained from conducting the special military operation should be fully considered when determining the priority areas for the development of domestic weapons and equipment, and the tactics for their use. For example, high-precision weapon systems employ new methods for guiding missiles at the end of their trajectory, enabling successful engagement against complex and fortified targets.
The interference immunity of onboard missile weapon systems has been significantly improved, and new methods of communicating flight missions have been tested. In the future, it is essential to identify targets in real-time, which is a crucial task for our military-industrial complex.
...to reduce the time required for decision-making in unit control on the battlefield, an inter-service information exchange system based on mobile devices has been created and has proven effective. Over 6,500 such systems have already been delivered to the troops. As a result of their use, the time taken for decision-making has decreased by 1.5 to 2 times.
It is now imperative to establish a unified information network that integrates reconnaissance and engagement capabilities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of control, through the introduction of advanced developments in the military-industrial complex.
Today, several thousand drones of various types are being delivered to the troops each day. We must continue to enhance their combat and operational characteristics. It is equally important to train the operators of such systems under programmes developed based on the experience of real combat operations."
Vladimir Putin 16 December 2024
"...Russian troops maintain a strong strategic initiative along the entire line of contact....Thanks to this commitment to the fate of their country and the future of their children, we have what I mentioned and what the Minister [of Defence Andrei Belousov] spoke about: in fact, this constitutes a break in the line of contact and our combat operations, a complete interception of the strategic initiative."
Vladimir Putin 16 December 2024
“…some time ago the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Missile Defence Treaty and started what amounts to undermining the fundamentals of international security. Yet another step has been made now. the US anti-missile deployment area is being created and was commissioned in Romania.What is this? These are launch pads and radar stations.
Today, 500-kilometre range Iskander land-based missiles are being deployed; in a few years they will be 1000-kilometre range missiles. We even know the approximate date when such missiles will be deployed.
How can this not be a threat to us? It is a clear threat to our nuclear forces.
However, there is something else that is even worse: these compact launch pads can accommodate assault missiles with a 2,400-kilometre range, and replacing the missiles is no problem, one only has to change the software, and nobody is going to notice anything, even the Romanians. Isn’t it a threat to us? It certainly is.
That is the reason we have to respond now, and if yesterday some areas in Romania did not know what it is like to be a target, today we will have to take action to ensure our security. Let me repeat, these are response measures, a response only. We were not the first to take such steps.
Vladimir Putin 27 May 2016
"Today, 500-kilometre range Iskander land-based missiles are being deployed; in a few years they will be 1,000-kilometre range missiles. We even know the approximate date when such missiles will be deployed. ...You saw, the whole world saw our capabilities in terms of medium-range sea and air based missiles. We are not violating anything, but the Iskander land-based missile systems have a brilliant record"
Vladimir Putin 27 May 2016
At the time the Russian President made this comment, the INF
Treaty was still in place. It prohibited ground-launched missiles
with a range of over 500 kilometers. The range of the Iskander-M
could be increased to 1,000 kilometers, but it could not be
deployed in ground based systems. But it in principle could be
built and not deployed. Clearly, the Russian President anticipated
that when Russia announced the new unbeatable hypersonic weapons
the US would 'officially' abandon the INF Treaty. He - rightly -
assessed the US would compensate for the inferior speed of US
tomahawk missiles by placing them hard up against the Russian
border, initially close to the historic command and control
centres in West Russia. For preference, right in the Crimean
Peninsular. And build a US naval base right in there, allowing US
permanent access to the Black Sea, and the threatening the Black
Sea coastline with US submarines and surface ships. Which carry
tomahawk cruise missiles tipped with tactical nuclear
weapons.
The Russian military announced in 2016 that they were going to
modernise the Iskander missile system, without giving details. The
Iskander system alone has great potential to end military
infrastructure of all kinds, as well as troop concentrations. It
is mobile, relatively cheap, and very flexible. The Iskander
complex can fire 2 missiles that travel at around mach 6-7
(hypersonic speed), either cruise (Iskander-K) or ballistic
missiles (Iskander-M). They can be fitted with several type of
warheads, from conventional munitions, bunker buster, cluster
warheads to 'low' yield (5 to 50 kilotonnes) tactical nuclear
warheads.
Once the US abandoned the INF treaty Russia would have a free
hand to modernise not just the Iskander, but a whole suite of
medium range missiles in order to reach every part of Europe - and
the west coast of the USA. The USA, for its part, of course had
long intended to ring Russia and China with just such land-based
missiles, placed in Ukraine, Norway, Poland, Turkey, Iran,
Afghanistan, the Central Asian 'stans', Mongolia, South Korea,
Japan, Philippines, and China's Taiwan province. In order to 'contain'
these two great countries.
The Russian President was simply warning Russia's expansion of
medium range missiles would inevitably happen as a result of US
actions, and by implication, that it would be better for the USA
to eventually agree on a multi-country strategic weapons treaty.
Part of the reason, of course, is that Russia's intermediate range
missiles could conceivably be placed in Venezuela and other South
or Central American countries. In the meantime, shorter range
hypersonic missiles (with conventional warheads) are on Russian
ships and submarines visiting Cuba, Venezuela and the Caribbean.
The missiles they carry will now become much longer range,
reaching deep into mainland USA.
And so it was.
On the 21 November 2024 Russia
deployed the Oreshnik
('Hazel' in english) its newest unstoppable
high precision hypersonic cruise missile. It, like others,
covers all of Europe and the Mediterranean can be loaded with
either conventional explosive or nuclear warheads. Its range is variously
estimated as between 4,000 and 5,500 kilometers. If it
was deployed in the Russian far east it could probably reach
as far as North Dakota, Idaho and Nevada in the the USA. It is
said to be mobile, so it will be hard to find and destroy, and
has a relatively fast re-load time.
It has at least 6
re-entry vehicles (submunitions), and each re-entry vehicle
can be independently targeted. The mode of action is
uncertain. Some authorities say the re-entry submunitions skip
across the top of the atmosphere on re-entry, much like
skipping a stone on a pond. Another says the re-entry vehicles
orient and aim after being released in space. They then
descend at a steep angle, without further guidance or
manouever. There are said to be 6 re-entry vehicles, and
allegedly these 6 vehicles can launch a further 6
submunitions. This weapon can be used to destroy concrete
bunkers deep in the ground, destroy airfields and aircraft on
the ground, troop concentrations, and perform other military
tasks.
Whatever the case,
such configurations can do immense damage, even from the
kinetic energy alone.
Russia is rightly concerned about the anti-ballistic missile
shield placed in Poland and Romania, which, if effective, destroys
strategic balance. The initial anti-ballistic missile shield
covering non-existent nuclear missiles from Iran, a 'threat' which
was the alleged basis for the anti-ballistic missile shield has
morphed into a shield to allegedly protect Europe from Russian
missiles. In fact, it is designed to protect mainland USA from
Russian strategic ballistic missiles at the early stage of their
launch, when they are traveling at their slowest. Russia had
suggested cooperative anti-ballistic missile shields, which would
have more or less ended the risk of nuclear weapons fired from
relatively close off-shore and from static land-based strategic
nuclear missiles.
The Russian President made this explicitly clear in 2019 when US
tore up the INF Treaty.
"...the unilateral US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that, as we have always believed, and as I am still convinced, was the cornerstone of the entire international security system.
We debated this matter for a long time, argued and suggested various solutions. In any event, I made very energetic attempts to convince our US partners not to withdraw from the Treaty.
And, if the US side still wanted to withdraw from the Treaty, it should have done so in such a way as to guarantee international security for a long historical period.
I suggested this, I have already discussed this in public, and I repeat that I did this because I consider this matter to be very important.
I suggested working jointly on missile-defence projects that should have involved the United States, Russia and Europe. They stipulated specific parameters of this cooperation, determined dangerous missile approaches and envisioned technology exchanges, the elaboration of decision-making mechanisms, etc. Those were absolutely specific proposals.
I am convinced that the world would be a different place today, had our US partners accepted this proposal.
Unfortunately, this did not happen.
We can see that the situation is developing in another direction; new weapons and cutting-edge military technology are coming to the fore. Well, this is not our choice."
Vladimir Putin 27 June 2019
... We have introduced a new postulate on it being possible to use the Armed Forces not only to rebuff but also prevent an armed attack on Russia or its allies, if this armed attack is absolutely inevitable.
Thereby we unequivocally let potential aggressors know that Russia will resolutely defend its right and the right of our allies to free and safe development."
Sergey Lavrov 19 June 2023
In other words, in case of an armed attack on Russia being
inevitable, even before open conflict erupts, Russia's cutting
edge, unstoppable, manoeuvering hypersonic conventional missiles,
fired from sea or land, will destroy the anti-ballistic missile
systems in Romania, Poland, and wherever they are installed. The Oreshnik alone has simply rendered all of
the US and European 'missile shields' useless.
"It goes without saying that when choosing, if necessary and as a retaliatory measure, targets to be hit by systems such as Oreshnik on Ukrainian territory, we will in advance suggest that civilians and citizens of friendly countries residing in those areas leave danger zones. We will do so for humanitarian reasons, openly and publicly, without fear of counter-moves coming from the enemy, who will also be receiving this information.Why without fear? Because there are no means of countering such weapons today.
Missiles attack targets at a speed of Mach 10, which is 2.5 to 3 kilometres per second.
Air defence systems currently available in the world and missile defence systems being created by the Americans in Europe cannot intercept such missiles.
It is impossible.
I would like to emphasise once again that it was not Russia, but the United States that destroyed the international security system and, by continuing to fight, cling to its hegemony, they are pushing the whole world into a global conflict.
We have always preferred and are ready now to resolve all disputes by peaceful means. But we are also ready for any turn of events.
If anyone still doubts this, make no mistake: there will always be a response."
Vladimir Putin 21 November 2024
Most likely all nuclear capable NATO bombers and nuclear capable
fighters within strike range of Russia will be destroyed at the
same time. Destroyed early and either with or without warning.
Checkmate. Defeated. All that money wasted. And it didn't have to
be this way.
"They [USA] are using various far-fetched pretexts to deploy ground-based anti-missile systems in close proximity to Russian borders.
Projects are rapidly unfolding to develop marine vessels, which regularly appear near the Russian coast.
The United States is also implementing plans to develop the space segment of its global missile defence system, which actually envisages the deployment of anti-missile strike weapons in space in the future.
In addition, in the context of their missile defence efforts, Washington included, at the doctrinal level, the possibility of carrying out “disarming” strikes against the missile capabilities of those countries that the United States considers to be its adversaries.It should be understood that attempts to present the global missile defence system as a purely defensive project are nothing more than a smoke screen. By building up its anti-missile capabilities, the United States mainly seeks to gain a decisive advantage by creating conditions for dealing the first strike to the enemy and protecting itself from retaliatory actions. This can and is already leading to serious consequences in the security sphere. It is upsetting the strategic balance of power in the world and spurring an arms race, including missiles..
For our part, we intend to act in accordance with the task set by the President of Russia to ensure a conflict-free coexistence by maintaining the balance of power and strategic stability.
In our dialogue with Washington on this track, we promote the concept of a comprehensive review of factors affecting strategic stability, embracing all weapons capable of solving strategic problems – nuclear and conventional, offensive and defensive. At the same time, when we discuss strategic defensive systems, we primarily mean due consideration of the missile defence factor.."
Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova 3 May 2021
"...the last time a credible military threat was placed near the border of the United States, the US responded so aggressively that it almost ended the world....the fact that people who think Russia and China should tolerate US actions on their borders that the US would never tolerate on its own borders actually believe the United States should rule the world. ...the only reason we survived that perilous standoff was because Washington made compromises and pulled its Jupiter missiles out of Turkey and Italy.
...the Cuban Missile Crisis shows how aggressively the US will respond to a foreign rival placing a military threat near its border....
...the single dumbest thing the US empire asks us to believe is that its amassing of war machinery near the borders of its top two geopolitical rivals should be seen as a defensive measure, rather than the act of extreme aggression that it obviously is..."
Caitlin Johnstone 27 August 2023
"The US Compliance Report again reads that the United States fully complies with its commitments under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). As before, we have no grounds to agree with this. Washington unilaterally withdrew a hundred strategic offensive arms from counting under the Treaty, and this problem remains outstanding. Let's recall the gist of this problem.
By February 5, 2018, Russia and the United States were supposed to reduce the aggregate numbers of these arms to the levels set out in Article II of the Treaty and not to increase them subsequently.
Russia fully complied with its commitment, which the US recognised. We cannot confirm that the US did this as well.
According to the United States, its aggregate level of deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers and strategic missile launchers amounts to 800, but in reality this number is much bigger. Washington did not count 56 submarine ballistic missile launchers and 41 B-52H heavy bombers. It claims that they were converted into a conventional-only role.
Russia is not able to verify the US “conversion”, as is envisaged by Item 3, Section I of Part Three of the New START Treaty’s Protocol.
In addition, the US does not count four silo launchers designed for training and tries to justify this by putting them into the category of silo training launchers that are not covered by the Treaty.
This US-created problem obviously undermines the Treaty and directly affects the prospects for extending it. A search for ways to resolve this problem has been futile so far.
We will continue trying to prevent the US from gaining unilateral advantages and to compel it to fully comply with all of the Treaty’s commitments.
After Washington destroyed the INF Treaty, New START is the last international treaty to limit the Russian and US nuclear missile potentials and to make activities in this area predictable and mutually verifiable."
Russia Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement 20 September 2019
"We, including the President, have repeatedly stated that Russia’s security is reliably ensured for decades to come.
The United States and its NATO allies are aware of that.
But the effectiveness of ensuring national security will only benefit from efficient and working mechanisms in the sphere of arms control.
The amounts spent on this work can be streamlined, if we choose to use this language.
In political and diplomatic terms, predictability and understanding of what we can expect from our opponents in terms of their capabilities will sharply decrease in the absence of the treaty.
Of course, what the US analysts point out as positive aspects of the New START Treaty – transparency and predictability – is important for us as well. Truth be told, a treaty built on parity and a balance of interests will do the same for us.
Even without the treaty, we will work to strengthen security and address issues, including political and diplomatic issues, through other means. As I mentioned earlier, it will be harder to do without it."
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov 6 March 2020
"...we cannot understand what they mean when they say that the treaty [the START Treaty] does not cover the latest Russian weapons, and that the renewal depends on the solution of this ‘problem.’ The treaty cannot be rewritten. If anybody wanted to do this, it would be a completely different document...
...Bringing up China is a huge political challenge and a very complicated, large issue. Even in terms of the working procedures and diplomacy it is an infeasible task.
We agree with China that before trying to reach some dubious and hard-to-reach goals, it is better to begin with the preservation of what is already there. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.
Had we received a note in response saying that “the United States is ready to renew the treaty if
a) the People’s Republic of China becomes a party, and
b) specific provisions are added to the text, we would have answered that extending the treaty under these terms would be impossible in view of the reasons that I have already mentioned.
We cannot fulfil these conditions just for the sake of pleasing the Americans."
Let me say a few more words on this subject. Regarding Russia’s new arms systems, we have told the Americans on multiple occasions that two of them, i.e., Avangard and Sarmat, can be included in the treaty. We have already shown one of them to the Americans.As for the other three, we are open to discussing this matter, but only as part of a conversation on the whole range of questions relating to ensuring strategic stability.
In this sphere, we have to primarily focus on US programmes and projects that are a matter of concern for us.
This includes the US global anti-missile defence, the prospects of US deploying offensive weapons in space, the prompt global strike programme, and many other questions.
The imbalance in conventional weapons is also a factor for us.
It would be impossible to come to a common denominator on matters of strategic stability without taking these questions into consideration.
The Americans refuse to listen to us when we try explaining why this matters.
They adopted an arrogant and mentoring tone, claiming that from now on the United States will discuss arms control only when decisions help strengthen its own security, as if they have ever acted differently, or we thought of anything other than ensuring our national security in the process.
Let me reiterate that we do not really understand whether the Americans are interested in keeping arms control in place as a means of ensuring security.
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov 17 April 2020
"When a hypervelocity impact occurs, the impactor compresses, sending a shock wave into the surrounding rocks. The shock waves also pass through the impactor itself, and as the wave passes through it, the impactor experiences a significant amount of pressure. When the shock wave reaches the upper surface of the projectile, it is reflected as a tensional wave or rarefaction wave. This reflected wave releases or unloads the built-up pressure from the shockwave—the release of pressure results in a rapid release of energy that melts or vaporizes the projectile."
Mike Mihajlovic 'Oreshnik enters the chat' 24 November 2024
"Concerning strike capabilities, I have already addressed this. If we deploy multiple such systems simultaneously in a single strike – say, two, three, or four systems – it would be comparable in force to the use of nuclear weapons, albeit they are not nuclear. This is because they are: a) high-precision; b) not equipped with a nuclear explosive device, thus they do not cause environmental contamination. Yet, the force would be comparable.Regarding the presence of explosives, I reiterate: this is why testing is conducted, to determine what requires further development. There is no great secret here; experts will readily grasp what I am referring to. When I speak of improvement, it primarily concerns the balance between range and warhead.
The greater the range, the smaller the warhead; conversely, the shorter the range, the more potent the warhead. The system is capable of lifting a greater payload in this scenario, that’s the crux of it.
For targets at varying distances, different missile types are required, or at least, distinct configurations of these missiles, specifically the warhead equipment. This is an area requiring attention. It is not a straightforward task, and it will likely necessitate additional research and development work, etc.
As for the missile we utilised, the appropriate elements were employed as the impact components, and they serve as damage agents as well.
As I have mentioned, these are quite potent elements that are heated to a temperature of 4,000 degrees. If I am not mistaken, (you can check online), the surface of the Sun is approximately 5,600–6,000 degrees, making it comparable to solar surface temperatures.
A kinetic impact is a formidable force, akin to a meteorite impact. History has shown us the effects and consequences of meteorite impacts. They have been sufficient to create entire lakes, have they not? Consider the Tunguska event and its outcomes.
Similarly here, the damage is substantial: everything at the centre is reduced to ash, breaking down into its elemental components, and objects located at a depth of three or four, possibly even more, floors below are affected. These are fortified structures, not merely floors. The impact force is immense. Of course, more can be added to amplify the effect.
The key point is that the functional sample has been created, it functions as intended by its designers. It is a high-precision and high-power weapon."
Vladimir Putin 28 November 2024
"No one else in the world has such weapons yet, as we and you know. Indeed, sooner or later other leading countries will have them, we know what kind of designs are being worked on there. However, it will be tomorrow, or in a year or two. Meanwhile, we have this system today. And this is essential."
Vladimir Putin 22 November 2024
"The interceptors could also be deployed on mobile platforms, on military vessels, for example...
...It would also have the advantage of providing a missile defence shield for all rather than just a part of Europe. This is because such a system would be able to intercept and destroy missiles fired at European territory during the first stage of the trajectory, and this, in addition, means that the remains of destroyed missiles would fall not on European cities but into the sea.
This is a serious matter because hunks of metal up to 30 centimetres across can not just punch a hole in the roof, but if they are falling at great speed, could rip through a five or seven storey building right down to the basement, and this is no joking matter."
Vladimir Putin 8 June 2007
"Experts disagree on the potential impact of competitor hypersonic weapons on both strategic stability and the U.S. military’s competitive advantage. Nevertheless, former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]) Michael Griffin has testified to Congress that the United States does not “have systems which can hold [China and Russia] at risk in a corresponding manner, and we don’t have defenses against [their] systems.”2
Although the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY2019 NDAA, P.L. 115-232) accelerated the development of hypersonic weapons, which USD (R&E) identifies as a priority research and development area, the United States is unlikely to field an operational system before FY2025."
Hypersonic Weapons:Background and Issues for Congress 2 December 2024, Sam LaGrone (U.S. Naval Institute)
"You mentioned toughening the nuclear doctrine. We are not toughening the nuclear doctrine. We are upgrading it.
And generally speaking, we need to improve Oreshnik rather than the nuclear doctrine.
When you think about it, the advancement of modern weapon systems has almost eliminated the necessity for the use of nuclear weapons.
This is why we are rather careful across all sectors. I would even say we are restrained. But where it is necessary, we show the will at the state level..."
Vladimir Putin 10 December 2024
"We consider ourselves entitled to use our weapons against military facilities of those countries that allow to use their weapons against our facilities, and in case of an escalation of aggressive actions, we will respond decisively and in mirror-like manner.
I recommend that the ruling elites of the countries that are hatching plans to use their military contingents against Russia seriously consider this."
Vladimir Putin 21 November 2024
"...we do not rule out the combat employment of Oreshnik on military-industrial facilities or command centres, including those in Kiev. We remain cognisant that the Kiev authorities continue their attempts to target our critical assets, including those in St. Petersburg and Moscow."
28 November 2024
"For instance, it would be futile to target a minor objective with a hypersonic missile, akin to “using a sledgehammer to crack a nut.”
However, we will utilise our entire arsenal against significant targets."
Vladimir Putin 28 November 2024
"we will in advance suggest that civilians and citizens of friendly countries residing in those areas leave danger zones."
Vladimir Putin 21 November 2024
"To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole"
See 22 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 427 (1948)
"As a reminder, the treaty was signed in 1990 between the members of the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO countries, to establish a balance of forces between the members of these military and political unions at lowered levels, and to restrict the deployment of their conventional weapons along the contact line.
However, subsequent events – dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and the Soviet Union, new conflicts on our territory and the consequential expansion of NATO to the east – prompted the adaptation of the CFE to the new circumstances.
At Russia’s insistence, the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed on November 19, 1999, in Istanbul, to never commence due to the destructive position of the Western countries that declined its ratification and continued bypassing the restrictions under the initial CFE by expanding the alliance.
In these conditions, Russia suspended the implementation of its CFE obligations in 2007 but left the door open for reviving conventional arms control in Europe.
The Western countries have had more than enough time to show common sense – and yet, they chose confrontation with Russia, which was reflected in NATO’s new strategic concept, among other things, not to mention the entirety of their hostile actions against our country, including the pumping of weapons and military equipment to the Kiev regime.
As emphasised in Russia’s notices, a safe and stable balance of conventional arms in the north of Europe has been seriously undermined by the recent accession to NATO of Finland, a non-CFE country that borders Russian territory which is regulated by the CFE, and the prospects of deploying conventional arms of third countries in Finland, along with the ongoing accession of Sweden, also not a CFE member. These steps were the last straw that prompted the Russian Federation to finally exit the treaty."
Foreign Ministry statement 9 June 2023
“We put forth numerous practical de-escalation and confidence-building proposals for the continent. The Alliance has disregarded all of them...
[…] We strongly recommend that the United States and NATO countries harbour no illusions that their aggressive behaviour towards nations will remain unpunished.
They should start thinking about the possibility of resuming discussions on a new architecture of European security after what they have done and intend to do. […]
We urge our colleagues to sober up and to ask themselves how they can implement the political obligations on the indivisibility of security in Europe, which they adopted at the top level during the OSCE summits in 1999 and 2010."
Maria Zakharova, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman 28 April 2022
"The situation in the field of arms control continues to get worse, due to the destabilising policies and destructive actions of the United States. At the same time, the Americans are deliberately adding to the tension in the field of international security. These inseparably interlinked processes enrich one another.As for the methods they use, the Americans opt either to dismantle contractual frameworks by withdrawing from them, as was the case with the ABM, INF and Open Skies treaties, or create conditions which make it impossible for the other side to fulfil their obligations. This is what happened with the CFE Treaty and the New START.
Washington follows a simple logic. The very foundations of US dominance are crumbling, which is largely attributable to the blunders of the Americans themselves, so confident were they in their exceptional nature, their infallibility and impunity.
They placed their bets on force in an attempt to slow down the erosion of their hegemony. This is why they have been seeking to secure their military supremacy and have a free hand to use force. And this is how we can explain their refusal to accept any restrictions in terms of arms control or other instruments for ensuring a strategic balance of interests among international actors.
Let me share just one example with you: the United States used a far-fetched pretext for dismantling the INF Treaty. In reality, the United States felt that it needed the missiles banned by the treaty, including against China. The restrictions became a nuisance to them, so they got rid of them without any hesitation. This step clearly had a negative bearing on regional and global security.
With the United States moving forward with its plans to deploy ground-based intermediate and shorter-range missiles in Europe and Asia-Pacific, Russia faces the increasingly urgent question of whether sticking with the moratorium on deploying similar weapons makes any sense, considering that this moratorium hinges upon the non-deployment of these US-made weapons in these regions.
As for the prospects for dialogue with the United States on the New START or reaching an agreement to replace it with another treaty, we sent a clear signal that there will be no dialogue as long as Washington continues with its anti-Russia policies.
It is obvious to us that the American proposals on launching nuclear arms control talks while keeping them separate from the negative military and political context and the dismal state of relations between Russia and the West are inadequate. We can see through what Washington is after: they want to mitigate nuclear risks to themselves while securing an advantage in terms of other military capabilities.
This approach, which the Americans refer to as compartmentalisation – a rather obscure and opaque notion, is absolutely unacceptable. It basically means that Russia is an enemy, but we want to get something from it. The fact that the United States and its allies persist with their efforts to promote escalation in and around Ukraine without hiding their intention of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia, makes this even more unacceptable.
We do not reject the concept of arms control. That said, any eventual dialogue on ways of minimising the potential for conflict or agreement on the way we will coexist with the West in the future, would require equality and respect for Russia’s core security interests, as well as acknowledgment of the whole new geopolitical reality. There is no point in discussing this topic any further unless the United States and its allies are ready to accept this."
Sergey Lavrov 28 December 2023
“We don’t have any relationship with the US at the moment. They are at zero degrees Kelvin. And we should not unfreeze them for now...Let them come or crawl and beg for it.
And they should value it as an act of utmost generosity.
Otherwise, this is how it looks: they toss only sleaze our way, and we go, 'there, have this nuclear deal, please'.”
Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chair of the Russian National Security Council, Telegram June 2022
In other words, the Americans are not serious. They give nothing and expect everything. Do they seriously think that Russia will give them anything they want while at the same time they attack Russia with all possible means? No. The Americans are playing for time. They are playing for time to develop their own hypersonic weapons. They will succeed, but it may take years rather than months. They will only talk in an adult manner about arms control when they have finally acquired manouevering hypersonic weapons.
"First, we see no need to use it [tactical nuclear weapons]; and second, considering this, even as a possibility, factors into lowering the threshold for the use of such weapons. This is my first point.The second point is that we have more such nuclear weapons than NATO countries. They know about it and never stop trying to persuade us to start nuclear reduction talks. Like hell we will, right? A popular phrase. (Laughter.) Because, putting it in the dry language of economic essays, it is our competitive advantage.
As you know, we have been in talks...about deploying some of these tactical nuclear weapons to Belarusian territory. This has happened. The first nuclear warheads have been delivered to Belarus, but only the first batch. There will be more. By...the end of this year, we will complete this work.
This is an element of deterrence, so that everyone who thinks of inflicting a strategic defeat on us should keep this circumstance in mind."
Vladimir Putin 16 June 2023
"the issue of creating a legal framework for international security and strategic stability is still on our to-do list.
Should these be new agreements or should we return to the old ones?
This is up to the experts to decide. You know, even when I was studying at the university, I did not study public international law, I studied private international law and my thesis was about it. Then, I did economics.But it is not even about ... the formal, or the legal aspect, but about the root of the matters that we should address as a team.
We have articulated our proposals. I mentioned [them] when I spoke before the Foreign Ministry’s senior officials. As a matter of fact, it was put on paper. But there must be goodwill on the part of those who are interested in seeing this happen.
We sometimes hear from the United States that they are willing to resume talks on this subject. But they appear to be undecided. At some point they seem to want it, next thing you know they do not. During the latter stint of President Obama’s administration, they let us know that they wanted to, but then all of a sudden they changed their mind.
Vladimir Putin 4 July 2024